Name
Affiliation
Papers
JORDI MASSÓ
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Edifici B, UAB, 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain
24
Collaborators
Citations 
PageRank 
17
103
16.46
Referers 
Referees 
References 
154
85
91
Search Limit
100154
Title
Citations
PageRank
Year
Corrigendum to “On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness” [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238]00.342021
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness00.342020
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness.00.342017
Matching markets under (in)complete information.50.902015
On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good.50.592015
The division problem under constraints.10.382015
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game.00.342014
On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria.10.402014
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria.80.812012
The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation40.672012
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles.20.412012
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness20.392011
Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences00.342008
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles20.702008
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem60.642007
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit20.452007
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets172.012007
Voting by committees under constraints111.432005
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings90.762004
A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem40.692004
Stability and voting by committees with exit70.702004
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model91.532003
The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games10.452002
Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem70.842001