Paper Info
Title
A scoring rule-based mechanism for aggregate demand prediction in the smart grid
Abstract
This paper presents a novel scoring rule-based strictly dominant incentive compatible mechanism that encourages agents to produce costly estimates of future events and report them truthfully to a centre. Whereas prior work has assumed a fixed budget for payment towards agents, this work makes use of prior information held by the centre and assumes a budget that is determined by the savings made through the use of the agents' information over the centre's own prior information. This mechanism is compared to a simple benchmark mechanism wherein the savings are divided equally among all home agents, and a cooperative solution wherein agents act to maximise social welfare. Empirical analysis is performed in which the mechanism is applied to a simulation of the smart grid whereby an aggregator agent must use home agents' information to optimally purchase electricity. It is shown that this mechanism achieves up to 77% of the social welfare achieved by the cooperative solution.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.5555/2343776.2343791
AAMAS
Keywords
Field
DocType
own prior information,smart grid,home agent,simple benchmark mechanism,prior work,aggregate demand prediction,cooperative solution,aggregator agent,fixed budget,social welfare,compatible mechanism,prior information,scoring rule-based mechanism,mechanism design
Scoring rule,Incentive compatibility,Smart grid,News aggregator,Computer science,Operations research,Mechanism design,Aggregate demand,Payment,Distributed computing,Social Welfare
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
0-9817381-2-5
20
1.29
References 
Authors
4
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Harry Rose1201.29
alex rogers22500183.76
Enrico H. Gerding375977.42