Paper Info
Title
Comprehensive Evaluation of AES Dual Ciphers as a Side-Channel Countermeasure
Abstract
Because of the isomorphisms in GF(28) there exist 240 different non-trivial dual ciphers of AES. While keeping the in- and outputs of a dual cipher equal to the original AES, all the intermediate values and operations can be different from that of the original one. A comprehensive list of these dual ciphers is given by an article presented at ASIACRYPTä2002, where it is mentioned that they might be used as a kind of side-channel attack countermeasure if the dual cipher is randomly selected. Later, in a couple of works performance figures and overhead penalty of hardware implementations of this scheme is reported. However, the suitability of using randomly selected dual ciphers as a power analysis countermeasure has never been thoroughly evaluated in practice. In this work we address the pitfalls and flaws of this scheme when used as a side-channel countermeasure. As evidence of our claims, we provide practical evaluation results based on a Virtex-5 FPGA platform. We realized a design which randomly selects between the 240 different dual ciphers at each AES computation. We also examined the side-channel leakage of the design under an information theoretic metric as well as its vulnerability to different attack models. As a result, we show that the protection provided by the scheme is negligible considering the increased costs in term of area and lower throughput.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1007/978-3-319-02726-5_18
ICICS
Field
DocType
Citations 
Countermeasure,Power analysis,Cipher,Attack model,Key schedule,Computer science,Arithmetic,Algorithm,Field-programmable gate array,Side channel attack,Collision attack,Distributed computing
Conference
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.35
29
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Amir Moradi196080.66
Oliver Mischke220411.53