Paper Info
Title
The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics.
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model for the timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. The defender moves first and the attacker second in a two-stage game which is repeated over T periods. We study the effects of dynamics of several critical components of counter-terrorism games, including the unit defence costs (eg, immediately after an attack, the defender would easily acquire defensive funding), unit attack costs (eg, the attacker may accumulate resources as time goes), and the asset valuation (eg, the asset valuation may change over time). We study deterministic dynamics and conduct simulations using random dynamics. We determine the timing of terrorist attacks and how these can be deterred. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2012) 63, 726-735. doi:10.1057/jors.2011.79 Published online 14 September 2011
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1057/jors.2011.79
JORS
Keywords
Field
DocType
information systems,operational research,marketing,operations research,investment,location,project management,scheduling,homeland security,logistics,information technology,production,communications technology,inventory,reliability,forecasting,management science,computer science
Economics,Deterrence theory,Computer security,Terrorism,Purchasing,Valuation (finance),Operations management
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
63
6
0160-5682
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
19
1.05
8
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Kjell Hausken153746.28
Jun Zhuang232630.54