Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1007/s00355-011-0533-6 | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
satisfiability | Welfare economics,Social choice theory,Mathematical economics,Economics,Axiom,Welfare,Pareto principle,Service time,Cost reduction,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
38.0 | 3 | 0176-1714 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.37 | 7 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| René Van Den Brink | 1 | 187 | 27.06 |
| Youngsub Chun | 2 | 94 | 20.80 |