René Van Den Brink

Author Info

Name	Affiliation	Papers
RENÉ VAN DEN BRINK	Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam, The Netherlands	37
Collaborators	Citations	PageRank
35	187	27.06
Referers	Referees	References
233	178	214

Search Limit

100233

Publications (37 rows)

Collaborators (35 rows)

Referers (100 rows)

Referees (100 rows)

Title	Citations	PageRank	Year
The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures.	0	0.34	2020
The Family of Ideal Values for Cooperative Games	5	0.52	2019
Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure	1	0.39	2018
Network Structures with Hierarchy and Communication.	0	0.34	2018
From Hierarchies to Levels: New Solutions for Games with Hierarchical Structure	2	0.44	2017
The reverse TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems.	0	0.34	2017
Power Measures and Solutions for Games Under Precedence Constraints	1	0.37	2017
An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure	3	0.47	2016
On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games	1	0.35	2015
Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values	7	0.61	2015
Union values for games with coalition structure.	1	0.38	2014
Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts.	1	0.36	2014
Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players.	4	0.57	2014
Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems.	1	0.36	2014
A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games.	4	0.53	2013
Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by Exemption and Exclusion properties.	4	0.54	2013
Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values.	28	2.67	2013
On hierarchies and communication.	6	0.64	2012
Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems.	1	0.37	2012
Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks	3	0.39	2012
A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure.	0	0.34	2011
Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games	13	1.06	2011
An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure	1	0.35	2010
Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure	1	0.38	2010
The VL control measure for symmetric networks	2	0.39	2009
The outflow ranking method for weighted directed graphs	6	0.48	2009
Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms	0	0.34	2008
Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions	38	2.64	2007
Potentials and reduced games for share functions	1	0.38	2007
A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure	9	1.33	2005
On two new social choice correspondences	1	1.10	2004
Ranking by outdegree for directed graphs	3	0.79	2003
An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property	9	1.01	2002
The apex power measure for directed networks	1	0.36	2002
An Iterative Procedure for Evaluating Digraph Competitions	10	1.79	2002
Core concepts for share vectors	4	0.73	2001
Measuring domination in directed networks	15	2.60	2000