Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles” to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory89, 165–185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, C610. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2002 | 10.1006/jeth.2001.2866 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
extensive-form games,behavior strategies,subjective uncertainty,rationalizability,self-confirming equilibrium | Journal | 104 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 0022-0531 | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.72 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eddie Dekel | 1 | 39 | 8.05 |
| Drew Fudenberg | 2 | 175 | 44.93 |
| David K. Levine | 3 | 114 | 22.08 |