Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the aspiration-and-imitation process of Binmore and Samuelson [Muddling through: noisy equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 74 (1997) 235–265] and the related processes proposed by Benaı¨m and Weibull [Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games, Econometrica 71 (2003) 873–903] and Traulsen et al. [Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 238701], as well as the frequency-dependent Moran process studied by Fudenberg et al. [Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation, Theoretical Population Biol. 70 (2006) 352–363]. We illustrate our results by considering the effect of the number of periods of repetition on the selected equilibrium in repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma when players are restricted to a small set of simple strategies. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.002 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C62,C72,C73 | Journal | 140 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0022-0531 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.66 | 3 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Drew Fudenberg | 1 | 175 | 44.93 |
| Lorens A. Imhof | 2 | 22 | 5.69 |