Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder’s sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2004 | 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Social Choice,Choice Function,Social Choice Function,Initial Member | Welfare economics,Social choice theory,Economics,Mathematical economics,Finite set,Sovereignty,Voting,Separable space,Choice function | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
23 | 2 | 0176-1714 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
7 | 0.70 | 4 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dolors Berga | 1 | 69 | 16.73 |
| Gustavo BergantiñOs | 2 | 207 | 26.51 |
| Jordi Massó | 3 | 103 | 16.46 |
| Alejandro Neme | 4 | 82 | 13.77 |