Title
On the power of fault sensitivity analysis and collision side-channel attacks in a combined setting
Abstract
At CHES 2010 two powerful new attacks were presented, namely the Fault Sensitivity Analysis and the Correlation Collision Attack. This paper shows how these ideas can be combined to create even stronger attacks. Two solutions are presented; both extract leakage information by the fault sensitivity analysis method while each one applies a slightly different collision attack to deduce the secret information without the need of any hypothetical leakage model. Having a similar fault injection method, one attack utilizes the non-uniform distribution of faulty ciphertext bytes while the other one exploits the data-dependent timing characteristics of the target combination circuit. The results when attacking several AES ASIC cores of the SASEBO LSI chips in different process technologies are presented. Successfully breaking the cores protected against DPA attacks using either gate-level countermeasures or logic styles indicates the strength of the attacks.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2011
CHES
combined setting,stronger attack,secret information,different process technology,collision side-channel attack,dpa attack,hypothetical leakage model,fault sensitivity analysis method,extract leakage information,similar fault injection method,powerful new attack,different collision attack
Field
DocType
Volume
Byte,Computer science,Application-specific integrated circuit,Collision,Combinational logic,Side channel attack,Ciphertext,Collision attack,Fault injection,Embedded system
Conference
6917
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
28
1.25
References 
Authors
20
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Amir Moradi196080.66
Oliver Mischke220411.53
Christof Paar33794442.62
Yang Li416513.44
Kazuo Ohta559763.83
Kazuo Sakiyama658357.35