Paper Info
Title
Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
Abstract
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any “executable” group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction, we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game.
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001
Journal of Economic Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
C70,C78,J44
Journal
129
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
1
0022-0531
10
PageRank 
References 
Authors
1.45
4
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hideo Konishi112635.99
M. Utku Ünver210215.37