Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C71,C72 | Journal | 148 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
6 | 0022-0531 | 4 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.53 | 5 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| René Van Den Brink | 1 | 187 | 27.06 |
| Gerard Van Der Laan | 2 | 148 | 24.79 |
| Nigel Moes | 3 | 5 | 0.90 |