Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore security systems should defend against them. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1016/j.comnet.2005.01.010 | USENIX Security |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Timing attack,RSA,Chinese remainder,Montgomery reductions,SSL | Journal | 48 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
5 | 1389-1286 | 388 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
20.44 | 8 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| David Brumley | 1 | 2940 | 142.75 |
| Dan Boneh | 2 | 21254 | 1398.98 |