Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In games with a permission structure it is assumed that players in a cooperative transferable utility game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there
are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. We provide axiomatic characterizations
of Banzhaf permission values being solutions that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to modified TU-games. In these characterizations we use power-
and player split neutrality properties. These properties state that splitting a player’s authority and/or contribution over two players does not change
the sum of their payoffs. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1007/s00182-009-0221-2 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cooperative game theory · permission structure · banzhaf value · split neutrality,transferable utility | Welfare economics,Permission,Mathematical economics,Axiom,Cooperative game theory,Transferable utility,Mathematics,Neutrality | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
39 | 3 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.38 | 5 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| René Van Den Brink | 1 | 187 | 27.06 |