Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
B This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational ability is sufficient to enable cooperative behavior. Ill addition, a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game is suggested, in which players have the choice of opting out. This modification enriches the game and suggests dominance of cooperative strate- gies. Competitive analysis is suggested as a tool for inves- tigating sub-optimal (but computationally tractable) strategies and game theoretic models in general. Us- ing competitive analysis, it is shown that for bounded players, a sub-optimal strategy might be the optimal choice, given resource limitations. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
1995 | Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research | prisoner's dilemma,conceptual and theoretical foundations of mnltiagent systems,competitive analysis,computational complexity,prisoner s dilemma |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Conference | abs/cs/070 | 8 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
2.75 | 3 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yishay Mor | 1 | 160 | 30.94 |
| Jeffrey S. Rosenschein | 2 | 2781 | 527.83 |