Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information, allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game, and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule. We offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent, regardless of the size of the jury, and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed. We prove a “jury theorem” for our general model: As the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule. For unanimity rule, the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence. Our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency, a property that could emerge only in a continuous model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2001 | 10.1006/game.2001.0843 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
bayesian model,spectrum,condorcet jury theorem | Journal | 37 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 0899-8256 | 24 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
58.47 | 1 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Duggan | 1 | 241 | 145.72 |
| César Martinelli | 2 | 46 | 63.23 |