Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C72,C73,D82 | Economics,Mathematical economics,Microeconomics,Common knowledge,Repeated game,Folk theorem | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
132 | 1 | 0022-0531 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.62 | 6 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Drew Fudenberg | 1 | 175 | 44.93 |
| David K. Levine | 2 | 114 | 22.08 |