Paper Info
Title
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
Abstract
We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets.
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.014
Journal of Economic Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
C62,C72,D44,D82
Journal
133
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
1
0022-0531
11
PageRank 
References 
Authors
1.59
1
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Drew Fudenberg117544.93
Markus Mobius2392.68
Adam Szeidl3495.21