Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper we study Classical Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (CIPD) dynamics of pure strategies in a discrete and determinist simulation context. We show that, in some very rare cases, they are not quiet and ordered. We propose a classification of
ecological evolutions into categories which represent complex dynamics, such as oscillatory movements. We also show that those
simulations are very sensitive to initial conditions. These experimentations could call into question classical conclusions about interest
of cooperation between entities playing CIPD. They may be used to explain why it is not true that cooperation is always the
convergent phenomenon observed in life.
|
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
1999 | 10.1007/10721187_13 | Artificial Evolution |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
classical iterated prisoner,initial condition,complex dynamics | Economics,Complex dynamics,Mathematical economics,Strategy,Prisoner's dilemma,Dilemma,Phenomenon,Nash equilibrium,Superrationality,Iterated function | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
3-540-67846-8 | 1 | 0.39 |
References | Authors | |
2 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Philippe Mathieu | 1 | 139 | 28.72 |
| Bruno Beaufils | 2 | 20 | 5.08 |
| Jean-Paul Delahaye | 3 | 325 | 54.60 |