Abstract | ||
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We formulate a new ranking procedure in the traditional context where each voter has expressed a linear order relation or ranking over the candidates. The final ranking of the candidates is taken to be the one which best adheres to a natural monotonicity constraint. For a ranking a≻b≻c, monotonicity implies that the strength with which a≻c is supported should not be less than the strength with which either one of a≻b or b≻c is supported. We investigate some properties of this ranking procedure and encounter some surprising preliminary results. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1016/j.inffus.2012.01.003 | Information Fusion |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Ranking,Social preference,Social ordering,Monotonicity | Monotonic function,Social preferences,Mathematical optimization,Ranking,Stochastic dominance,Artificial intelligence,Mathematics,Machine learning | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
17 | 1566-2535 | 10 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.82 | 10 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Michaël Rademaker | 1 | 90 | 8.14 |
Bernard De Baets | 2 | 2994 | 300.39 |