Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.011 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C78 | Journal | 74 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 0899-8256 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.41 | 1 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ruth Martínez | 1 | 22 | 3.09 |
| Jordi Massó | 2 | 103 | 16.46 |
| Alejandro Neme | 3 | 82 | 13.77 |
| Jorge Oviedo | 4 | 59 | 9.11 |