Title
Protecting Cipher Block Chaining Against Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attack
Abstract
In the literature, several encryption modes of operation based on cipher block chaining (CBC) has been proven to be secure under non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack (CPA-1) in the left-or-right (LOR) or find-then-guess (FTG) security models. However, it was shown by Joux et. al. at Crypto 2002 that if we allow the adversary to perform an adaptive chosen plaintext attack (CPA-2), then CBC, ABC and GEM are susceptible to FTG attacks. In this paper, we propose a new CBC-type encryption called input-output masked CBC (IO-CBC) which can protect against FTG and LOR attacks based on forcing an input collision, protects against Joux's FTG attack under proper implementation, and increases the difficulty of linear and differential cryptanalysis. The efficiency of IO-CBC is comparable to CBC because it does only one additonal encryption when compared with CBC. We also reasoned that the security proof of an IO-CBC variant follows from that of OCB.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2006
SECRYPT 2006: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY
cipher block chaining,adaptive chosen plaintext attack,input-output masked CBC
Field
DocType
Citations 
Transposition cipher,Computer security,Computer science,CBC-MAC,Theoretical computer science,Rail fence cipher,Stream cipher,Stream cipher attack,Residual block termination,Slide attack,Ciphertext stealing
Conference
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
7
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Chuan-Wen Loe1183.57
Khoongming Khoo225023.29