Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or “core”) point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2006 | 10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Ideal Point, Median Voter, Active Player, Majority Preference, Quadratic Utility | Welfare economics,Social choice theory,Mathematical economics,Economics,Voting,Ideal point,Microeconomics,Quadratic equation,Lottery,Euclidean space,If and only if,Lemma (mathematics) | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
26 | 2 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
11 | 1.85 | 4 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jeffrey S. Banks | 1 | 50 | 12.51 |
| John Duggan | 2 | 241 | 145.72 |