Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value restricted to the class of apex games using an equal loss property which states that the payoff of an apex player and a non-apex player decrease by the same amount if we make this particular non-apex player a null player. We also generalize
this axiomatization to the class of games that can be obtained as sums of apex games. After discussing these axiomatizations
we apply apex games and their Shapley values in measuring relational power in directed networks. We conclude by mentioning
how these results can be adapted to give axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2002 | 10.1007/s003550200162 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Relational Power,Power Measure,Directed Network,Loss Property,Null Player | Mathematical economics,Apex (geometry),Shapley value,Mathematics,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
19 | 4 | 0176-1714 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.36 | 3 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| René Van Den Brink | 1 | 187 | 27.06 |
| vu | 2 | 856 | 122.39 |