Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2001 | 10.1006/game.2001.0850 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
satisfiability | Mathematical economics,Maximal set,Existential quantification,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
37 | 2 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
7 | 0.84 | 1 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jordi Massó | 1 | 103 | 16.46 |
| Alejandro Neme | 2 | 82 | 13.77 |