Title
Privacy Analysis of Forward and Backward Untraceable RFID Authentication Schemes
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the first known provably secure Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) authentication schemes that are designed to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability: the L-K and S-M schemes. We show how to trace tags in the L-K scheme without needing to corrupt tags. We also show that if a standard cryptographic pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is used in the S-M scheme, then the scheme may fail to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability. To achieve the desired untraceability features, we show that the S-M scheme can use a robust PRBG which provides forward security and backward security. We also note that the backward security is stronger than necessary for the backward untraceability of the S-M scheme.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1007/s11277-010-0001-0
Wireless Personal Communications
Keywords
Field
DocType
Security and privacy in mobile systems,Wireless,Radio frequency identification,Traceability,Provable security,Analysis
Authentication,Wireless,Computer science,Computer security,Cryptography,Computer network,Forward secrecy,Radio-frequency identification,Traceability,Provable security,Pseudorandom number generator
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
61
1
0929-6212
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
14
0.70
32
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Raphael C.-W. Phan170366.89
Jiang Wu2578.18
Khaled Ouafi32008.51
Douglas R. Stinson42387274.83