Paper Info
Title
A secure threshold anonymous password-authenticated key exchange protocol
Abstract
At Indocrypt 2005, Viet et al., [20] have proposed an anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol and its threshold construction both of which are designed for client's password-based authentication and anonymity against a passive server, who does not deviate the protocol. In this paper, we first point out that their threshold construction is completely insecure against off-line dictionary attacks. For the threshold t 1, we propose a secure threshold anonymous PAKE (for short, TAP) protocol with the number of clients n upper-bounded, such that n ≤ 2√N - 1 - 1, where N is a dictionary size of passwords. We also show that the TAP protocol provides semantic security of session keys in the random oracle model, with the reduction to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, as well as anonymity against a passive server. For the threshold t = 1, we propose an efficient anonymous PAKE protocol that significantly improves efficiency in terms of computation costs and communication bandwidth compared to the original (not threshold) anonymous PAKE protocol [20].
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1007/978-3-540-75651-4_30
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
threshold construction,provable security,passive server,tap protocol,secure threshold,pake,off-line dictionary attack,password authentication,efficient anonymous pake protocol,anonymous pake protocol,anonymous password-authenticated key exchange,anonymous pake,key exchange,anonymity,dictionary size,upper bound,random oracle model,dictionary attack,semantic security
Conference
2008
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
0302-9743
3-540-75650-7
15
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.76
23
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Seonghan Shin1548.57
kazukuni kobara238747.00
Hideki Imai361543.56