Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the
Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm,
Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Ω-value introduced by Berganti�os, Casas-M�ndez, and V�zquez-Brage (2000). The main difference
being that the maximal aspiration a player may have in the game is his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution.
We show that it is well defined on the class of totally essential and non-level games. We propose an extensive-form game whose
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs coincide with the Chi-compromise value. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2002 | 10.1007/s001860200193 | Math. Meth. of OR |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
ntu game,compromise value,subgame perfect nash equilibrium,nash equilibrium,game theory,utility theory | Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Game theory,Compromise,Transferable utility,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics,Utility theory | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
56 | 2 | 1432-2994 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.45 | 2 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gustavo BergantiñOs | 1 | 207 | 26.51 |
| Jordi Massó | 2 | 103 | 16.46 |