Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected
in the communication graph. Solutions for such graph games can be obtained by applying standard solutions to a modified or restricted game that takes account of the cooperation restrictions.
We discuss Harsanyi solutions which distribute dividends such that the dividend shares of players in a coalition are based on power measures for nodes in corresponding communication graphs. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions on
the class of cycle-free graph games and on the class of all graph games. Special attention is given to the Harsanyi degree
solution which equals the Shapley value on the class of complete graph games and equals the position value on the class of cycle-free graph games. The Myerson value is the Harsanyi power solution that is based on the equal power measure. Finally, various applications are discussed. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1007/s00182-009-0220-3 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cooperative tu-game · harsanyi dividend · communication structure · power measure · position value · myerson value jel codes c71,community structure,complete graph,transferable utility,shapley value | Welfare economics,Complete graph,Graph,Mathematical economics,Dividend,Axiom,Shapley value,If and only if,Transferable utility,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
40 | 1 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
13 | 1.06 | 9 |
Authors | ||
5 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| René Van Den Brink | 1 | 187 | 27.06 |
| Gerard Van Der Laan | 2 | 148 | 24.79 |
| Vitaly Pruzhansky | 3 | 21 | 2.01 |
| vu | 4 | 484 | 46.89 |
| faculteit der economische wetenschappen en bedrijfskunde | 5 | 211 | 16.75 |