Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson [The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design, Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1999) 748–780] in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants in the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C78,D81,J44 | Journal | 136 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0022-0531 | 17 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
2.01 | 4 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lars Ehlers | 1 | 78 | 10.01 |
| Jordi Massó | 2 | 103 | 16.46 |