Title
A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games.
Abstract
We establish that general discounted stochastic games with state transitions that are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed, atomless measure admit stationary semi-Markov perfect equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which each player's action depends only on the current state and on the previous state and action profile. This resolves an open existence question stemming from an error in the proof of Theorem 4 of Chakrabarti [3]. Moreover, the result follows from “un-correlating” Nowak and Raghavan's [25] stationary correlated equilibrium, establishing that there is no need to resort to additional, unmodeled state variables.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.001
Journal of Economic Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
C62,C73
Journal
151
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0022-0531
5
0.56
References 
Authors
1
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Paulo Barelli1164.83
John Duggan2241145.72