Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Suppose a strict preference relation fails to possess maximal elements, so that a choice is not clearly defined. I propose
to delete particular instances of strict preferences until the resulting relation satisfies one of a number of known regularity
properties (transitivity, acyclicity, or negative transitivity), and to unify the choices generated by different orders of
deletion. Removal of strict preferences until the subrelation is transitive yields a new solution with close connections to
the “uncovered set” from the political science literature and the literature on tournaments. Weakening transitivity to acyclicity
yields a new solution nested between the strong and weak top cycle sets. When the original preference relation admits no indifferences,
this solution coincides with the familiar top cycle set. The set of alternatives generated by the restriction of negative
transitivity is equivalent to the weak top cycle set. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1007/s00355-006-0176-1 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
maximal element,satisfiability,political science | Mathematical economics,Combinatorics,Preference relation,Maximal element,Mathematics,Transitive relation | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
28 | 3 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
7 | 1.01 | 4 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Duggan | 1 | 241 | 145.72 |