Title
AES variants secure against related-key differential and boomerang attacks
Abstract
In this paper, we present a framework for protection against the recent related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES by Biryukov et al. Then we study an alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. at ACISP 2002 as a possible candidate to protect against these related key attacks. We find that there exist equivalent keys for this key schedule and in response, we propose an improvement to overcome this weakness. We proceed to prove, using our framework, that our improved May et al.'s key schedule is secure against relatedkey differential and boomerang attacks. Since May et al.'s key schedule is not on-the-fly (which is a requirement for some hardware implementations), we propose an on-the-fly AES key schedule that is resistant against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_13
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
aes variant,related key attack,alternative aes key schedule,related-key differential,boomerang attack,hardware implementation,recent related-key differential,on-the-fly aes key schedule,key schedule,equivalent key,relatedkey differential,differential cryptanalysis
Conference
2011
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
7
0.62
References 
Authors
11
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jiali Choy1444.10
Aileen Zhang281.31
Khoongming Khoo325023.29
Matt Henricksen413113.55
Axel Poschmann593343.62