Title
Higher Order Differential Attacks on Reduced-Round MISTY1
Abstract
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper shows that higher order differential attacks can be successful against 6-round and 7-round versions of MISTY1 with FL functions. The attack on 6-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 253.7 and a computational complexity of 253.7, which is the smallest computational complexity for an attack on 6-round MISTY1. The attack on 7-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 254.1 and a computational complexity of 2120.7, which signifies the first successful attack on 7-round MISTY1 without limiting conditions such as a weak key.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1007/978-3-642-00730-9_26
ICISC
Keywords
Field
DocType
7-round misty1,reduced-round misty1,data complexity,6-round misty1,7-round version,successful attack,smallest computational complexity,partial subkey,cryptrec project,computational complexity,higher order differential attacks,higher order differential attack,provable security,linear cryptanalysis,higher order,block cipher
Higher-order differential cryptanalysis,Boomerang attack,Block cipher,Computer science,NESSIE,Theoretical computer science,Linear cryptanalysis,Slide attack,CRYPTREC,Differential cryptanalysis
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
5461
0302-9743
9
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.60
12
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Y. Tsunoo114615.25
T. Saito2777.29
Maki Shigeri3736.66
Takeshi Kawabata429651.73