Abstract | ||
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Trojan side channels (TSCs) are serious threats to the security of cryptographic systems because they facilitate to leak secret keys to attackers via covert side channels that are unknown to designers. To tackle this problem, we present a new hardware Trojan detection technique for TSCs. To be specific, we first investigate general power-based TSC designs and discuss the tradeoff between their hardware cost and the complexity of the key cracking process. Next, we present our TSC identification technique based on the correlation between the key and the covert physical side channels used by attackers. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
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Year | DOI | Venue |
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2014 | 10.1109/ICCAD.2014.7001363 | ICCAD |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
tsc identification technique,invasive software,trojan side channel identification,cryptography,general power-based tsc design,trojan side channel design,covert side channels,cryptographic systems,key cracking process complexity,hardware,smart home,correlation,cyberattack,cybersecurity | Hardware Trojan,Cryptography,Computer science,Computer security,Communication channel,Covert,Home automation,Real-time computing,Power demand,Side channel attack,Trojan,Embedded system | Conference |
ISSN | ISBN | Citations |
1933-7760 | 978-1-4799-6277-8 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.36 | 13 | 7 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Jie Zhang | 1 | 2 | 0.36 |
Guantong Su | 2 | 2 | 0.36 |
Yannan Liu | 3 | 66 | 6.54 |
Lingxiao Wei | 4 | 68 | 4.90 |
Feng Yuan | 5 | 363 | 21.01 |
Guoqiang Bai | 6 | 75 | 14.56 |
Qiang Xu | 7 | 2165 | 135.87 |