Title
On trojan side channel design and identification
Abstract
Trojan side channels (TSCs) are serious threats to the security of cryptographic systems because they facilitate to leak secret keys to attackers via covert side channels that are unknown to designers. To tackle this problem, we present a new hardware Trojan detection technique for TSCs. To be specific, we first investigate general power-based TSC designs and discuss the tradeoff between their hardware cost and the complexity of the key cracking process. Next, we present our TSC identification technique based on the correlation between the key and the covert physical side channels used by attackers. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1109/ICCAD.2014.7001363
ICCAD
Keywords
Field
DocType
tsc identification technique,invasive software,trojan side channel identification,cryptography,general power-based tsc design,trojan side channel design,covert side channels,cryptographic systems,key cracking process complexity,hardware,smart home,correlation,cyberattack,cybersecurity
Hardware Trojan,Cryptography,Computer science,Computer security,Communication channel,Covert,Home automation,Real-time computing,Power demand,Side channel attack,Trojan,Embedded system
Conference
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
1933-7760
978-1-4799-6277-8
2
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.36
13
7
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jie Zhang120.36
Guantong Su220.36
Yannan Liu3666.54
Lingxiao Wei4684.90
Feng Yuan536321.01
Guoqiang Bai67514.56
Qiang Xu72165135.87