Title
On Pure Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games.
Abstract
Ummels and Wojtczak initiated the study of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multi-player games satisfying specific bounds. They showed that deciding the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (pureNE) where a fixed player wins almost surely is undecidable for games with 9 players. They also showed that the problem remains undecidable for the finite-strategy Nash equilibrium (finNE) with 14 players. In this paper we improve their undecidability results by showing that pureNE and finNE problems remain undecidable for 5 or more players.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1007/978-3-319-17142-5_31
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
Stochastic games,Nash equilibrium,Pure strategy,Finite-state strategy
Correlated equilibrium,Mathematical economics,Combinatorics,Risk dominance,Epsilon-equilibrium,Strategy,Computer science,Price of stability,Best response,Almost surely,Nash equilibrium
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
9076
0302-9743
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.37
5
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ankush Das1174.34
Shankara Narayanan Krishna224342.57
Lakshmi Manasa3305.03
Ashutosh Trivedi414928.08
Dominik Wojtczak515117.50