Paper Info
Title
Off-Path Hacking: The Illusion of Challenge-Response Authentication
Abstract
Everyone is concerned about Internet security, yet most traffic isn't cryptographically protected. The typical justification is that most attackers are off path and can't intercept traffic; hence, intuitively, challenge-response defenses should suffice to ensure authenticity. Often, the challenges reuse existing header fields to protect widely deployed protocols such as TCP and DNS. This practice might give an illusion of security. Recent off-path TCP injection and DNS poisoning attacks enable attackers to circumvent existing challenge-response defenses. Both TCP and DNS attacks are nontrivial, yet practical. The attacks foil widely deployed security mechanisms and allow a wide range of exploits, such as long-term caching of malicious objects and scripts.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1109/MSP.2013.130
Security & Privacy, IEEE  
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Internet,computer network security,telecommunication traffic,transport protocols,DNS poisoning attacks,Internet security,challenge-response authentication illusion,challenge-response defenses,cryptography protection,off-path TCP injection,off-path domain name system,off-path hacking,protocols,security mechanisms,transmission control protocol,DNS cache poisoning,TCP injections,challenge-response defenses,off-path attacks,security
Journal
12
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
5
1540-7993
9
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.82
11
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yossi Gilad120316.29
Amir Herzberg22877353.46
Haya Shulman329337.26