| Poster: DNS in Routers Considered Harmful | 0 | 0.34 | 2022 |
| Poster: RPKI Kill Switch | 0 | 0.34 | 2022 |
| Poster: The Unintended Consequences of Algorithm Agility in DNSSEC | 0 | 0.34 | 2022 |
| Behind the Scenes of RPKI | 0 | 0.34 | 2022 |
| Poster: Insights into Global Deployment of RPKI Validation | 0 | 0.34 | 2022 |
| Injection Attacks Reloaded: Tunnelling Malicious Payloads over DNS | 0 | 0.34 | 2021 |
| Computer Security - ESORICS 2021 - 26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Darmstadt, Germany, October 4-8, 2021, Proceedings, Part I. | 0 | 0.34 | 2021 |
| The Hijackers Guide To The Galaxy: Off-Path Taking Over Internet Resources | 0 | 0.34 | 2021 |
| SMap - Internet-wide Scanning for Spoofing. | 0 | 0.34 | 2021 |
| Computer Security - ESORICS 2021 - 26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Darmstadt, Germany, October 4-8, 2021, Proceedings, Part II. | 0 | 0.34 | 2021 |
| The Impact of DNS Insecurity on Time | 6 | 0.56 | 2020 |
| Diving into Email Bomb Attack | 0 | 0.34 | 2020 |
| Limiting the Power of RPKI Authorities | 0 | 0.34 | 2020 |
| Secure Consensus Generation with Distributed DoH | 3 | 0.43 | 2020 |
| Pitfalls of Provably Secure Systems in Internet the Case of Chronos-NTP | 0 | 0.34 | 2020 |
| MPC for Securing Internet Infrastructure | 0 | 0.34 | 2020 |
| Black-box caches fingerprinting | 0 | 0.34 | 2020 |
| Performance penalties of resilient SDN infrastructures | 0 | 0.34 | 2020 |
| DISCO: Sidestepping RPKI's Deployment Barriers | 3 | 0.45 | 2020 |
| Securing DNSSEC Keys via Threshold ECDSA From Generic MPC. | 0 | 0.34 | 2019 |
| Optimal Transport Layer For Secure Computation | 1 | 0.43 | 2019 |
| Internet As a Source of Randomness. | 0 | 0.34 | 2018 |
| Removing the Bottleneck for Practical 2PC | 0 | 0.34 | 2018 |
| Off-Path Attacks Against PKI | 1 | 0.40 | 2018 |
| Domain Validation++ For MitM-Resilient PKI. | 17 | 1.02 | 2018 |
| Path MTU Discovery Considered Harmful | 2 | 0.41 | 2018 |
| Perfect is the Enemy of Good: Setting Realistic Goals for BGP Security. | 1 | 0.35 | 2018 |
| Practical Experience: Methodologies for Measuring Route Origin Validation | 5 | 0.57 | 2018 |
| Are We There Yet? On RPKI's Deployment and Security. | 8 | 0.66 | 2017 |
| One Key To Sign Them All Considered Vulnerable: Evaluation Of Dnssec In The Internet | 3 | 0.43 | 2017 |
| Towards Enhancing The Visual Analysis Of Interdomain Routing | 2 | 0.39 | 2017 |
| Counting in the Dark: DNS Caches Discovery and Enumeration in the Internet | 4 | 0.51 | 2017 |
| Authentication-Bypass Vulnerabilities in SOHO Routers | 0 | 0.34 | 2017 |
| NetCo: Reliable Routing With Unreliable Routers | 3 | 0.43 | 2016 |
| Stratum Filtering: Cloud-based Detection of Attack Sources. | 0 | 0.34 | 2016 |
| Towards Automated Measurements of Internet's Naming Infrastructure | 0 | 0.34 | 2016 |
| Is the Internet Ready for DNSSEC: Evaluating Pitfalls in the Naming Infrastructure. | 0 | 0.34 | 2016 |
| Detection and Forensics of Domains Hijacking. | 1 | 0.35 | 2015 |
| Cipher-Suite Negotiation for DNSSEC: Hop-by-Hop or End-to-End? | 3 | 0.63 | 2015 |
| Towards Security of Internet Naming Infrastructure. | 11 | 0.76 | 2015 |
| DNS authentication as a service: preventing amplification attacks. | 9 | 0.54 | 2014 |
| Ethical considerations when employing fake identities in online social networks for research. | 5 | 0.70 | 2014 |
| Negotiating DNSSEC Algorithms over Legacy Proxies | 3 | 0.46 | 2014 |
| Fragmentation Considered Leaking: Port Inference for DNS Poisoning. | 15 | 0.81 | 2014 |
| Retrofitting Security into Network Protocols: The Case of DNSSEC | 15 | 0.96 | 2014 |
| Less is more: cipher-suite negotiation for DNSSEC. | 1 | 0.39 | 2014 |
| Towards Forensic Analysis of Attacks with DNSSEC | 5 | 0.60 | 2014 |
| Off-Path Hacking: The Illusion of Challenge-Response Authentication | 9 | 0.82 | 2014 |
| POSTER: On the Resilience of DNS Infrastructure | 3 | 0.42 | 2014 |
| Vulnerable Delegation of DNS Resolution. | 24 | 1.67 | 2013 |
