Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
It is difficult to protect an operating system kernel in an efficient way. Attackers can corrupt or subvert it by two different means: (1) the CPU; (2) the Direct Memory Access (DMA) capability of I/O controllers. DMA-based attacks can be blocked using an I/OMMU. This component, embedded in most of current chipsets, enables the operating system to virtualize the main memory for I/O controllers and to restrict their access to only some memory regions. In this paper, we present different vulnerabilities we identified on Intel VT-d, which implements an I/OMMU. An example of exploitation of one of them is then detailed. Finally, we give some recommendations to prevent these vulnerabilities from being used for malicious purposes. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1109/MALWARE.2010.5665798 | Malicious and Unwanted Software |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
file organisation,operating system kernels,security of data,I/O controllers,I/OMMU vulnerability,Intel VT-d,direct memory access,operating system kernel | Kernel (linear algebra),Central processing unit,Computer science,Computer security,Direct memory access,Operating system kernel,Chipset,restrict,Operating system,Embedded system,Vulnerability | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-1-4244-9353-1 | 22 | 1.55 |
References | Authors | |
1 | 4 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fernand Lone Sang | 1 | 22 | 1.55 |
| Éric Lacombe | 2 | 22 | 1.55 |
| Vincent Nicomette | 3 | 22 | 1.55 |
| Yves Deswarte | 4 | 1142 | 156.24 |