Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. A proper Shapley value, introduced in Vorob’ev and Liapounov (Game Theory and Applications, vol IV. Nova Science, New York, pp 155–159, 1998), assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. In this contribution we investigate these proper Shapley values in the context of monotone games. We prove their existence for all monotone transferable utility games and discuss other properties of this solution. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.1007/s00182-014-0439-5 | International Journal of Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Proper Shapley value, Proportionality, Weighted Shapley value, Shapley mapping, Fixed point, C71 | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Dividend,Shapley–Shubik power index,Shapley value,Game theory,Fixed point,Transferable utility,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Mathematics,Monotone polygon | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
44 | 2 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.35 | 5 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| René Van Den Brink | 1 | 187 | 27.06 |
| René Levı́nský | 2 | 2 | 1.45 |
| Miroslav Zelený | 3 | 4 | 1.79 |