Title
A Newton Collocation Method for Solving Dynamic Bargaining Games
Abstract
We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis 2008, unpublished manuscript. We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the model, and we show that they are locally Lipchitz continuous and directionally differentiable. In numerical experiments, we successfully implement a globally convergent variant of Broyden’s method on a preconditioned version of the collocation equations, and the method economizes on computation cost by more than 50% compared to the value iteration method. We rely on a continuity property of the equilibrium set to obtain increasingly precise approximations of solutions to the continuum model. We showcase these techniques with an illustration of the dynamic core convergence theorem of Duggan and Kalandrakis 2008, unpublished manuscript in a nine-player, two-dimensional model with negative quadratic preferences.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1007/s00355-010-0513-2
Social Choice and Welfare
Keywords
Field
DocType
collocation method,value iteration
Convergence (routing),Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Orthogonal collocation,Quadratic equation,Markov decision process,Differentiable function,Collocation method,Mathematics,Computation,Collocation
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
36
3-4
1432-217X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.74
11
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
John Duggan1241145.72
Tasos Kalandrakis2254.33