Title
Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
Abstract
•We purify BNE in Bayesian games with finitely many actions, interdependent payoffs, and correlated types.•We extend the results to BNE in undominated strategies.•We provide examples illustrating the usefulness of our approach.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.005
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
C72,D82
Interdependence,Welfare economics,Economics,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Finite set,Voting,Global game,Common value auction,Nash equilibrium,Bayes' theorem,Bayesian probability
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
94
0899-8256
2
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.43
6
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Paulo Barelli1164.83
John Duggan2241145.72