Paper Info
Title
Preference exclusions for social rationality.
Abstract
I develop sufficient conditions for transitivity and acyclicity of social preferences, continuing the investigation of restricted domains begun by Black (J Polit Econ 56:23–34, 1948; The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1958), Arrow (Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York, 1951), and Sen (Econometrica 34:491–499, 1966; Rev Econ Stud 36:381–393, 1969). The approach, which excludes certain triples of rankings over triples of alternatives, contributes to the literature in three ways. First, I generalize majority rule to classes of social preference relations defined by their decisiveness properties. Second, I consider not only transitivity of weak and strict social preference, but I provide conditions for acyclic strict preference as well. Third, the well-known conditions of value restriction, single peakedness, and order restriction are shown to satisfy corresponding exclusion conditions, so transitivity results on these domains follow from the more general analysis; in particular, the results are applied to weakly single-peaked preference profiles, and a result on acyclicity due to Austen-Smith and Banks (Positive political theory I. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999) is obtained as a special case. In contrast to the latter authors, the approach fixes a single preference profile and does not rely on the properties of social preferences as individual preferences are varied.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1007/s00355-015-0906-3
Social Choice and Welfare
Keywords
Field
DocType
Majority Rule, Social Preference, Order Restriction, Aggregation Rule, Preference Profile
Social choice theory,Social preferences,Mathematical economics,Social rationality,Economics,Arrow,Value restriction,Majority rule,Positive political theory,Transitive relation
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
46
1
1432-217X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.40
0
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
John Duggan1241145.72