Title
Sustaining mutual cooperation in iterated prisoner's dilemma game
Abstract
In this paper, we study the conditions under which mutual cooperation among one-step memory evolutionary agents instochastic iterated prisoner's dilemma game platform can be sustained. The agents evolve along the gradient of the payoff field. A metric is introduced to quantify players' ability to sustain cooperation with other players. Numerical experiment indicates each allele's role in sustaining the cooperative relationship by hiding its weaknesses to the opponent. The results were analyzed mathematically via transforming the problem into Markov chain state value problem to obtain partial derivatives of payoff functions. Finally, possible applications of methodology and results in this paper to multi-agent systems control are discussed.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1145/2695664.2696031
SAC 2015: Symposium on Applied Computing Salamanca Spain April, 2015
Keywords
Field
DocType
Prisoner's Dilemma, Reinforcement learning, Multi-agent system, Cooperation, Artificial Life
Mathematical economics,Computer science,Markov chain,Prisoner's dilemma,Multi-agent system,Artificial intelligence,Dilemma,Traveler's dilemma,Superrationality,Reinforcement learning,Stochastic game
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
978-1-4503-3196-8
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Kim Minsam100.34
Kwok Yip Szeto26421.47