Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are often considered to be resilient to eavesdropping by design, since light cannot penetrate most walls and objects. In this paper, we experimentally study the ability of a VLC eavesdropper to intercept and decode a transmission even while being outside of the direct beam. We design a testbed using software defined radios (SDRs) and evaluate different VLC eavesdropping scenarios. We find that a small gap under a door can be sufficient for an eavesdropper to decode high-order modulated (DCO-OFDM 64-QAM) reflected signals outside of a room. Likewise, neither Victorian keyholes nor window coatings provide any significant protection against information leakage to the outside. Furthermore, eavesdroppers located in the same room but not facing the sender can profit from reflections on walls. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.1145/2801073.2801075 | VLCS@MobiCom |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Wireless network,Telecommunications,Eavesdropping,Information leakage,Software-defined radio,Computer network,Communication source,Testbed,Visible light communication,Engineering,Throughput | Conference | 11 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.67 | 5 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jiska Classen | 1 | 33 | 9.10 |
| Joe Chen | 2 | 14 | 1.05 |
| Daniel Steinmetzer | 3 | 69 | 8.50 |
| Matthias Hollick | 4 | 750 | 97.29 |
| Edward W. Knightly | 5 | 4763 | 371.38 |