Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
RSA is one of the most widely used public key cryptographic algorithms in embedded cryptographic devices. However, the side-channel attacks especially simple side-channel analysis (SPA) can obtain information about the cryptosystem by measuring power consumption and processing time. To resist this attack there appear a number of countermeasures such as classical exponent randomization and messages blinding. This paper present an improved power attack on RSA when the public exponent is short, for instance 3 or 2(16) +1, and when the classical countermeasures are used. This attack works by distinguishing the conditional subtraction of Montgomery modular multiplication (MMM). Simulation and experiment results demonstrate that this attack method can retrieve secret keys easily using a few power traces. Several countermeasures that can resist this kind of attack are also proposed in this paper. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1109/CIS.2016.139 | PROCEEDINGS OF 2016 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (CIS) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
RSA, Power attack, Montgomery modular multiplication, Conditional subtraction | Power analysis,Attack model,Computer science,Public key fingerprint,Computer security,Cryptosystem,Timing attack,Pre-play attack,Chosen-ciphertext attack,Side channel attack | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
6 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bing Zhao | 1 | 1 | 0.75 |
| Lihui Wang | 2 | 0 | 2.37 |
| Kun Jiang | 3 | 0 | 1.01 |
| Xiaobing Liang | 4 | 1 | 1.76 |
| Weijun Shan | 5 | 0 | 1.69 |
| Jing Liu | 6 | 0 | 0.68 |