Paper Info
Title
Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria.
Abstract
This paper addresses the question of existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in a class of dynamic games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation. General sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria are currently lacking in a number of interesting environments, e.g., models with non-convexities, consumption lower bounds, or an evolving state variable. The main result establishes existence of equilibrium under compactness and continuity conditions, without the structure of convexity or strict comprehensiveness used in the extant literature. The proof requires a precise selection of voting equilibria following different proposals using a generalization of Fatou's lemma.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.013
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
Bargaining,Coalition formation,Equilibrium existence,Dynamic games
Welfare economics,Economics,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Convexity,Voting,Markov perfect equilibrium,Compact space,Extant taxon,State variable,Lemma (mathematics),Bargaining problem
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
102
0899-8256
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
4
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
John Duggan1241145.72