Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Exploiting Bitflip Detector for Non-invasive Probing and its Application to Ineffective Fault Analysis |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Matsuda et al. proposed a countermeasure against laser fault injection that uses distributed on-chip sensors. The sensor raises an alarm by detecting an electrical phenomenon caused in conjunction with a bitflip. A cryptographic module can stop releasing a faulty ciphertext by using the alarm. In this paper, security and limitation of the countermeasure by Matsuda et al. is rigorously evaluated. We show that an attacker can get side-channel information by observing how the sensors react to laser fault injection. That enables the attacker to probe intermediate values in a chip non-invasively. On the one hand, under a chosen-plaintext setting, the laser-based probing enables to run the conventional probing attack on AES by Schmidt and Kim. On the other hand, under a ciphertext-only setting, the laser-based probing raises a new challenge: the attacker is given correct ciphertexts and corresponding single-bit probing results. We propose a new ineffective fault analysis against AES based on linear cryptanalysis that can be used in the above setting. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1109/FDTC.2017.17 | 2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
fault analysis,fault detector,probing attack,ineffective fault analysis,linear cryptanalysis | Logic gate,ALARM,Computer science,Cryptography,Real-time computing,Chip,Linear cryptanalysis,Ciphertext,Detector,Fault injection | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-1-5386-2949-9 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
15 | 6 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Takeshi Sugawara | 1 | 126 | 12.25 |
| Natsu Shoji | 2 | 2 | 1.74 |
| Kazuo Sakiyama | 3 | 583 | 57.35 |
| kohei matsuda | 4 | 5 | 2.16 |
| Noriyuki Miura | 5 | 306 | 61.16 |
| Makoto Nagata | 6 | 285 | 76.47 |