Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Career incentive contract design in project management under companies' competition and asymmetric information. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
•We consider career incentive contract under companies’ competition.•We derive the respective optimal compensation contracts in eight cases.•Not providing career incentive contracts is better off in some circumstances.•The certain condition under which competition has no effect is identified.•Advice on mitigating the impact of information asymmetry is provided. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1016/j.cie.2018.02.024 | Computers & Industrial Engineering |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Incentive mechanism,Project management,Competition,Information asymmetry | Information asymmetry,Incentive,Profitability index,Principal–agent problem,Monopoly,Engineering,Industrial organization,Private information retrieval,Unobservable,Operations management,Project management | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
118 | 0360-8352 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.35 | 10 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zhihua Chen | 1 | 14 | 2.27 |
| Yanfei Lan | 2 | 218 | 15.92 |
| Nana Ma | 3 | 2 | 1.71 |