Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider decision models associated with cooperative influence games, the oblivious and the non-oblivious influence models. In those models the satisfaction and the power measures were introduced and studied. We analyze the computational complexity of those measures when the influence level is set to unanimity and the rule of decision is simple majority. We show that computing the satisfaction and the power measure in those systems are #P-hard. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1016/j.endm.2018.06.034 | Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Decision model,Influence game,Satisfaction,Power,Banzhaf value | Discrete mathematics,Unanimity,Mathematical economics,Decision model,Mathematics,Computational complexity theory | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
68 | 1571-0653 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 4 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xavier Molinero | 1 | 133 | 15.58 |
| Fabián Riquelme | 2 | 29 | 8.02 |
| Maria J. Serna | 3 | 473 | 70.53 |